Multi-Recastable E-Bidding Game with Dual-Blindness

Electronic auctions (e-auction) enable bidders to bid for diverse sold objects under an electronic platform via the Internet. Relevant literature has presented numerous online bidding auction schemes considering different security issues. However, none of them can satisfy all essential properties simultaneously and some of them possess security vulnerabilities. For example, the winner cannot hold the properties of anonymity and unlinkability without re-registration for the auction of another product. In order to cope with the above problems, this study presents an e-auction scheme which owns the following features: every bidder’s anonymity during the entire auction, unlinkability among plural auctions of different selling topics, unforgeability, no framing (tamper resistance of bidding tickets), non-repudiation, public verifiability of all bidding tickets, and easy revocation for illegal activities. In our e-bidding protocol, all participants can take part in a sequence of different auctions for various products unlimitedly after performing one time of registration, where the winner does not need to re-register again, either. We formally prove the security of the proposed scheme and also provide comparisons to show that it is the most efficient one as compared with previous works.